The early 1960’s saw the United States and the Soviet Union square off in the height of the “Cold War”, that period when nuclear weapons were aimed at strategic targets in both countries and throughout Europe. In spite of the joint cooperation by the two termed “superpowers” in the demise of the Hitler regime during World War II, at that point we did not trust each other. The joint effort by these countries along with the other Allies in the great effort to overcome the Axis powers changed the course of history, and the commendable cooperation in this tremendously long and costly war will forever be a highlight of world history. The rapid transition between friend and ally to deadly adversaries in the forty decade Cold War is certainly one of the ironies of our times.
Following a five and one-half year tour of duty at Luke AFB in Arizona I was assigned to the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing based at the Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath base, located 60 miles northeast of London. The Wing had only recently been relocated from France when General DeGaulle decided in his independent rationale that he no longer had much regard for the Americans, who had undoubtedly been the largest contributing factor in his country being freed from the German occupation of Europe only fifteen years prior. In spite of the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States implementation of the Marshall Plan, which effectively rebuilt Europe, trust among nations in world affairs was lacking in all quarters.
The 48th Tactical Fighter Wing was equipped with three squadrons of F-100 fighter aircraft capable of multiple missions: tactical air support and interdiction, air superiority, and nuclear weapons delivery capability. It was the latter that was to be the prime function of the 48th Wing. On a continuous around the clock capability each squadron had four aircraft and aircrew assigned on a fifteen minute reaction time for possible delivery of nuclear weapons on assigned targets in East Germany and eastern Russia. These twelve aircraft were housed in a secured area with tight controls and were configured with four external fuel tanks that allowed for long distance delivery of a nuclear bomb that was carried on a centerline station. Other bases in the United Kingdom and in friendly West Germany had the same prime mission so the capability to hit numerous targets within the Soviet sphere was possible.
A week’s schedule was divided by 48 hour, 48 hour, and 72 hour shifts – the 72 hour period covering Friday and the weekend. With each squadron supplying four pilots within these time frames, twelve aircrew members would be on a constant fifteen minute reaction time within the compound for either a full two days or three days if on a weekend. With that constant rotation and with a squadron of some 22 to 24 fully qualified combat ready pilots, this nuclear alert duty came around quite regularly.
When on duty the nuclear alert crews were subject to the sound of a klaxon at any hour of the day or night. Practice alerts were frequently employed to test our reaction time. When the loud horn sounded twelve pilots were expected to rapidly exit the ready room, pile into a van just outside the door, be transported some 200 yards to revetments which housed the twelve F-100D aircraft that were always fully fueled and configured for flight with a nuclear bomb, get in the cockpit with the auxiliary starting unit on, and check in on the radio. At that time the word would be passed that it was simply an exercise and to return to the compound. An elaborate, tightly controlled system of a challenge and authenticate code was used to confirm that the word being passed was from proper channels and not compromised.
Adequate sleeping rooms were available, but upon retiring the flight suit was placed directly over the flying boots so that one could jump out of bed, place the legs in the flight suit and the feet in the zippered boots in almost one motion, and run to the van. Final adjustments to the flying gear could be made in the van’s short drive to the waiting aircraft. Our parachutes, helmets, survival gear, and other required items would have been previously placed within the cockpit. It was never known when the klaxon sounded if all hell had broken loose within the military control and command centers at the direction of our government leaders or if this was just another practice alert. The F-100 aircraft were never to be moved from their parked station with a nuclear weapon on board unless it was to be a war time reaction. That the aircraft in the nuclear configuration were never moved was obviously the case. The Soviet Union and the United States never came in direct armed conflict – but nevertheless it was our mission to be continually at the ready.
Each aircrew was responsible for being intimately familiar with three different targets and for a war time reaction to any of the three. On every sounding of the klaxon all twelve pilots had to prove their capability to react to the cockpit and be prepared for a rapid launch within the fifteen minute time frame. Upon authorization to return to the compound and confirmation that this had been a practice alert all crews would then be exposed to a written test. This entailed a proof of knowledge of wartime operating procedures and a total awareness of the mission profile and target familiarity. Always required was the capability to draw from memory a detailed sketch of the final run into the target from an identified initial point at which a low level approach was begun. Failure to display proper knowledge would result in that pilot’s removal from combat ready status.
During that two or three day period on nuclear alert there were busy times and periods of inactivity. The targeted areas were continually changing based on the latest intelligence. Any change would entail an adjustment to, or the making of, new maps to be used for the mission profile. A mission “strip map” was required for all targets. This entailed the cutting of maps into a cockpit convenient folding map that could easily be strapped on your leg and unfolded as the progress of the mission was flown. This was a necessity for fighter bomber aircraft wherein a single pilot had full responsibility for pilotage, navigation, bomb setup, and completeness of the assigned mission. Other standard operating procedures often changed and much on-going study was essential to remain fully cognizant of these changes, whether relating to the aircraft, its delivery system, or to directives that often came from the Squadron or from higher headquarters.
At those those periods of time when there was no pressing study required or mission changes to be made, games were played, or quiet reading would occupy our time. A frequent pastime was card playing, especially bridge. Four of us, clothed in our flight attire perhaps unzipped a bit, would pair off and play for a penny a point. It was not uncommon for those sessions to last for hours – I participated in games that went on non-stop for up to twenty hours. When one tired of playing there would usually be another pilot ready to serve as a replacement. Those long bridge playing sessions would normally attract the attention of observers – kibitzers, that were on many occasions directed to watch if they desired but to keep their sarcastic comments to themselves.
A cold war nuclear mission flight profile in the F-100D aircraft was termed a high-low-high profile. That meant that you would depart RAF Lakenheath, climb to a high altitude enroute until a point twenty to thirty miles from the target, descend rapidly to a 500 foot low level altitude on a heading to over fly an easily identified initial point, make the target run in at 500 knots airspeed (approximately 575 miles per hour) hugging the terrain for maximum surprise, fly directly over the target and pull up in an Immelman maneuver as the nuclear bomb was released, and reverse course to gain maximum distance from the target prior to bomb detonation. The maneuver was performed with full throttle and with the engine in afterburner, which gave a fifty percent boost to the powerful Pratt & Whitney J-57 jet power plant. The Immelman maneuver was effectively a half loop with a roll out on the top which allowed the pilot to head back to friendly territory in the reverse direction. It was also designed to give the air crew enough separation from the bomb blast to survive the nuclear detonation. This was known as a LABS maneuver in Air Force terminology, standing for Low Altitude Bombing System.
There were other methods of delivering a nuclear bomb but over the years the LABS maneuver was proven to the best and most accurate and was utilized throughout the military. This was long before the advent of “smart bombs”, or cruise missiles that would now be the method of delivering the massive destruction of nuclear weapons. The LABS maneuver was regularly practiced by combat ready pilots on gunnery and bombing ranges, dropping small inert 25 pound smoke bombs over a circled target that enabled one to determine accuracy. At the target center, from a 500 foot level run-in at a speed of 500 knots, a four “g” (or a force equal to four times the force of gravity – a two hundred pound man would effectively weigh 800 pounds) pull up would be initiated. This force would be held as long as possible up to the ninety degree point or at the vertical ascent position. At that point the four “g” force could not be maintained, but by maintaining a force just short of a high speed stall three “g’s” were held as you continued over the top of the maneuver. The bomb would release at about 118 degrees of turn after you had gained 8,000 to 9,000 feet of altitude above the target. A special instrument in the cockpit displayed pitch and roll information and aided in the exactness of the pull up. The maneuver would be continued until the aircraft’s nose was pointed back down to the horizon at 45 degrees, at which point a half roll would upright the aircraft as the course was reversed. With greatly increasing speed the distance from the nuclear detonation would then be a reasonably safe eight to ten miles. The nuclear bomb weighing 2000 pounds would, after release from the aircraft, travel upward to approximately 12,000 feet, hesitate and return to the target primed to detonate at about 1,000 feet over the target center for maximum destruction. A pre-set gyro setting within the airframe would dictate the bomb release after proper setting of the armament switches within the cockpit. The arc of the released bomb, if viewed from abeam the LABS maneuver, would actually be from a point well beyond the target, then curve up and back down to the impact point. A bomb detonation within 1,500 feet of the target center would be considered acceptable and within 500 feet would be outstanding.
If we had participated on an actual nuclear reaction, dropped our terribly destructive weapon, had survived and headed back west to friendly territory, we accepted the fact that we could only hope that there would be a base within our allied countries where we could safely recover. Many of the targets were of such distance that it was known that the remaining fuel on board after bomb release would not allow a return to home base. We knew that if we were in the process of dropping “nukes” on the enemy he in turn was doing the reciprocal and that many or possibly all of our bases would be destroyed. Should a friendly base not be located, then the only recourse would have been ejection from our aircraft, bailing out over hopefully friendly terrain that was not too horribly radioactive. Those musings were usually afterthoughts – our main point of emphasis for our planning was getting in, releasing our weapon over the assigned target, and getting out. We did carry 800 rounds of 20 mm cannon fire in four fuselage mounted guns that were available in reserve for any air combat encountered.
The twelve F-100D North American built swept wing fighter bomber aircraft on constant nuclear alert at RAF Lakenheath were configured with four fuel wing tanks, along with the nuclear bomb mounted on a centerline station on the belly of the aircraft. A mission profile called for a climb out to 26,000 feet at which time two of the inboard fuel tanks would be empty of their fuel and would be dropped from the aircraft. Each of those tanks would contain 400 gallons of fuel all used up in the initial climb. With a lighter load at that time a climb to 32,000 feet would be made and maintained until the rapid descent to the target initial reference point short of the target. The planning then called for the release of those two tanks which had contained 550 gallons of fuel, now expended. The aircraft was now configured in a clean state with only the nuclear weapon remaining. Therefore, greater speed could be easily attained for the nuclear bomb release and exit from the target area. An F-100D aircraft, in its clean configuration with full internal fuel and pilot weighs 30,245 pounds, or over 15 tons. The aircraft on nuclear alert, with four fuel tanks and a nuclear weapon onboard, weighs over 39,000 pounds, or nearly 20 tons, which was the aircraft’s maximum weight allowance.
At least once every eighteen months all tactical fighter bomber wings would be exposed to an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), an unannounced thorough evaluation by higher headquarters personnel who determined the unit’s capability to perform its assigned missions in a satisfactory manner. Included in this all encompassing inspection would be the direction to fly multiple wartime scenario missions that would terminate in the dropping of a simulated nuclear bomb. The target after flying a low level approach would, in this case, be on a controlled bombing range where bomb impact scores could be evaluated. Squadron aircraft maintenance, armament loading procedures, navigational proficiency, time over target, bomb impact scores, flying safety awareness, and all aspects of the unit’s mission were evaluated within a compressed time frame. It was during these type inspections that combat ready pilots had an opportunity to closely simulate flying a wartime mission type profile. The aircraft would be configured not with the practice 25 pound smoke bombs, but rather with a “blue boy” bomb. This was a bomb shell the size and shape of a nuclear bomb, but with a ton of sand contained within so that the release of this dummy bomb had the same characteristics as that positioned on the nuclear alert aircraft.
The release of this 2,000 pound dummy bomb from a LABS maneuver over the target was an exhilarating experience. A mission profile was flown similar to that described previously with a high speed run-in at 500 knots at 500 feet above the ground enabling the dropping of the simulated weapon on the bombing range at a previously planned time over target. Each pilot was graded on navigation techniques, time over target, bomb impact point, compliance with a multitude of directives, flying safety considerations, and recovery and turn around capability. Frequently each pilot would be tasked to fly two to three sorties during the inspection, which would normally be concluded within a 48 hour time frame.
The point during the LABS pull up when the bomb released left the pilot with absolutely no doubt that the 2,000 pound bomb had exited the aircraft. A feeling and sound of “Whoooom” when the bomb departed was a real load off the airframe. At the point of release the aircraft was traveling at about 325 knots under a three “g” load, therefore, the effective weight of the bomb at that time was 6,000 pounds. The aircraft felt the loss of such a huge weight instantaneously and was suddenly a more maneuverable airplane. Since this was not the “real war”, but a simulation, our procedure was to circle the bombing range target and observe the impact point. This was easy to see as identified by a nose mounted smoke charge and the disturbance of a large amount of sand or sod at the impact crater. It was relatively easy to pick up the upward arc of the “blue boy” bomb after release, watch it travel up another 3,000 to 4,000 feet above the release point, observe its apogee, a slight hesitation and rotation, and then begin its rapid descent. The visualization of the subsequent nuclear detonation in a real war environment with its familiar mushroom cloud could be imagined.
The tremendous loss of life imparted by the dropping of a nuclear bomb in a wartime reaction could be dwelled upon but that was not the prime consideration in our actions. Our goal was to be prepared to professionally fly our assigned mission to the best of our ability. That was our function – dedicated mercenaries in the defense of freedom and of our country. As any member of the military will relay – ’tis far better to kill your adversary before your adversary kills you.
The United States has dropped but two nuclear bombs in anger but their impact will forever be felt. I have no doubt that these two bombs reigning massive destruction on Japan in World War II resulted in greatly decreased loss of life by both the Allied forces as well as the Axis warriors of Japan. The casualties suffered by the soldiers, sailors, and airmen by both sides of the war would have far surpassed the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had the conflict continued without the use of the war ending nuclear weapons. The decision by President Truman in 1945 to employ these weapons will, in history’s final analysis, be fully justified.
Wings Over Cumberland 